Although there are a great number of fair trade goods which do not carry the Fairtrade© Mark (especially crafts and clothing), Cafédirect adopted the Fairtrade© certification in setting up its brand. As a result, we will focus primarily on these FLO certification standards here rather than of the others offered by organisations such as the International Federation for Alternative
Trade (IFAT), European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) and Network of European World Shops (NEWS).
The FLO standards aim to ensure both better working conditions and more sustainable farming practice in grower communities. As coffee and tea prices are volatile, the FLO sets minimum market prices (floor price) that are paid for Fairtrade© certified products to cover the cost of production. For example, the Fairtrade© minimum prices for different types of coffee beans are as follows: Arabica coffee = 131 US cents/lb; Arabica organic coffee= 151 US cents/lb; Robusta coffee =111 US cents/lb; Robusta organic coffee =131 US cents/lb (in November, 2008) . Whenever the world market prices go above these minimum prices;
Fairtrade© also guarantees a higher-than-market price to growers through an additional "social premium" of between 5-15 cents per kg, depending on the product. For coffee, this equates to paying the market price plus 10 US cents/lb. Through these two pricing mechanisms, Fairtrade© aims to guarantee a long term, sustainable commitment to its growers, giving them more opportunity to plan for the future and to invest in their farms and communities.
Following the introduction of fair trade labelling, fair trade evolved rapidly both in terms of sales and public awareness. With increasing levels of institutionalization, it has established itself as one of the major initiatives to pursue social purposes using market mechanisms, i.e. poverty alleviation for small-scale producers in the South through sales for products in the North 1 Nicholls and Opal, 2005; Raynolds et al, 2007) . Nicholls and Opal (2005) propose that fair trade is a new business approach that looks holistically at the supply chain to address market failures and their social impacts at source whilst acknowledging the need for profitability.
Worldwide, consumers spent over £1.6 billion on Fairtrade© Marked products in 2007, with over 7.5 million producers and workers across 58 developing countries benefiting (FLO, 2008) . A number of authors (e.g. Golding and Peattie, 2005 , Lowe and Davenport, 2005a and 2005b Nicholls and Opal, 2005) identify the mainstreaming 2 of fair trade through the successful branding of fair trade companies, such as
Cafédirect and Divine Chocolate, as a key factor in the rise of such products. However, the mainstreaming of fair trade produce is not without its critics.
The Pros and Cons of Mainstreaming Fair Trade
A number of authors have reported on the positive arguments for Fairtrade© Marked products being in the mainstream because of increased sales which benefit a larger number of marginalised producers, and the opportunity to reach a wider audience with the fair trade message (Lowe and Davenport 2005a , 2005b , Nicholls and Opal, 2005 . In fact, earlier research on fair trade highlights the problem of poor availability in supermarkets as a limiting factor in the growth of fair trade sales (Nicholls 2002 , Nicholls and Opal 2005 , Ronchi 2001 and Strong 1997 . Furthermore, Teather (2006) argues that the involvement of major retailers has been a key factor in the growth and Taylor et al (2005) According to the Economist (2006), the decision to buy fair trade products in grocery stores sends out a very clear political message. A number of authors agree that consumers act neither as a purely economic agent nor as purely political agent, but as a mixture of the two;
with consumers whose identity, beliefs and practices aim to address the economic imbalances highlighted by the fair trade movement (Parker 1999 , Urry, 1995 . Connolly and Shaw (2006) suggest that many ethical consumers believe they are part of a wider collective of concerned argue the fair trade products in the mainstream need to work on the depth of the fair trade message to avoid it being seen just as a lifestyle choice, something we will explore later through Cafédirect advertising.
Despite the growth in fair trade, a number of authors warn that uncritical engagement with mainstream business risks absorption and dilution of the fair trade movement (Lowe and Davenport 2005a , 2005b , Murray et al 2006 , Taylor et al 2005 . This can lead to 'clean-wash' which occurs when a company "derives positive benefits from its association with the fair trade movement, however minimal its efforts to live the values" (Murray and Raynolds 2000:p68-69) . also highlight the possibility that corporate commitment to fair trade may only be temporary. Taylor et al (2005) argue that corporations cannot be expected to have the same levels of interest and commitment that inspired the creation of the fair trade system, as evidenced by the proliferation of other ethical labels outside the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO) system which do not demonstrate the equivalent social standards. The Fairtrade© labelling system does not differentiate between organisations which are solely fair trade companies with direct links with producers, and the larger corporations whose fair trade commitment is only a small percentage of their sales. Raynolds et al (2007) propose that one of the challenges facing fair trade organisations will be to ensure it is not just about increasing prices but also maintaining a transformative alternative system with people and the environment at its centre. Davenport (2005a and 2005b) argue that fair trade in the mainstream has already shifted the message from participation in an international programme of trade reform to individualised shopping for a better world by focussing mainly on the dimensions of fair price for producers and product quality.
Nestlé's 2005 UK launch of its fair trade coffee, Partners Blend, has brought this debate of 'clean-wash' into sharp focus (Cookson 2005) as the company still occupies the top spot in the Ethical Consumer Organisation's list of boycotted brands, largely due to its aggressive marketing of baby milk powder in developing countries. Nestlé makes no secret of the commercial reasons for its decision to launch a fair trade product and aims to target the semiethical segment. According to Tallontire et al (2001) , semi-ethical consumers are infrequent purchasers of ethical goods who may be persuaded to buy more if the goods were made more attractive or more easily available to them. Currently, Partners Blend makes up only 0.2% of the Nestlé coffee range, with the remainder of its coffee being bought at the prevailing world market price. However, it claims that there are just not enough fair trade coffee producers to switch production to fair trade for its major lines.
Fair trade brand pioneers like Cafedirect and Divine Chocolate are partly-owned by producer groups with producer representatives on the Boards of these companies in unique governance arrangements. argue that these fair trade companies as examples of radical mainstreaming that can actually strengthen the transformative message of fair trade. By investigating such companies through the type of longitudinal study reported here, we can gain greater insights into the impacts of mainstreaming on the fair trade ideology, and the growing pains of fair trade and other similar social initiatives as they emerge from their grass roots to mainstream, highly visibility organisations.
The Founding of Cafédirect
The International Coffee Agreement which controlled the price of coffee beans collapsed in 1989. This caused the price of coffee beans to fall to a third of its pre-1989 level within a few years and had a devastating effect on the incomes of small-scale coffee farmers globally (Brown, 2007) . Three quarters of the global supply of coffee is produced by small, family owned farms. In response to this crisis Oxfam, Traidcraft, Equal Exchange and Twin Trading got together in 1991 and formed the branded fair trade coffee company, Cafédirect. All four organisations were already involved in the distribution of fair trade coffee into the UK but they realised that collectively they could achieve so much more:
"Our contribution to Cafédirect was that we were the only member who had any marketing Oxfam shops. Cafédirect is the fifth largest coffee brand in the UK with a 7% market share of the roasted and ground coffee market (Mintel, 2008) and sources coffee beans from 39 producer organisations across 13 different countries which means that over a 250,000 growers benefit. Cafédirect's product portfolio includes 15 coffee products (from roast and ground, espresso, decaffeinated, organic to instant), 3 tea products and Cocodirect drinking chocolate. with a wide range of fair trade brands positioned at differing pricing points and offering a range of qualities (from budget to premium) and with a number of multinational coffee brands who now include a fair trade brand in their portfolio. In each case, the brands are marketed according to the unique social/environmental attributes they can display.
Cafédirect has followed similar stages in its marketing evolution to those outlined above since its introduction in 1991. One of the main guiding principles for Cafédirect in the early days was that it had to shake the stigma associated with the poor quality 'charity products'.
Consistent high product quality standards were seen by Cafédirect management as critical because its benchmark competition was viewed as mainstream brands such as Nescafé original, and Kenco medium roast. Since launch, Cafédirect has achieved this and has always been viewed as premium quality brand with retail prices 20-30% above competition throughout most of its brand lifecycle. Cafédirect argues that its investment in producer organisations via PPP ensures that product quality is second to none across its three main product lines. Its first major product line was R&G coffee; however, market research revealed that the majority of UK consumers were drinking freeze dried coffee, so in 1994 it launched a freeze dried instant coffee. This enabled the company to make its first profits in 1995 and heralded the start of Cafédirect's strong growth which was continuously fuelled by new product introductions. As such three years later, Cafédirect entered the tea market with
Teadirect and then, in 2002, Cocodirect drinking chocolate was launched using both fair trade cocoa and sugar. Recently, they have released many gourmet single-source-of-origin coffees (some of them organic), a range of premium instant coffees and specialist teas.
Bearing in mind Cafédirect's strong brand name today, it is hard to imagine they have never advertised on television. The company has even won the 2004 Marketer of the Year Award from the Marketing Society on an official marketing budget of only £4,000 (less than 0.02% of the total marketing spend in the industry). This has been achieved through the clever use of partners, volunteers and network associates. Principally, PR, journalism and print advertising have been the driving force behind Cafédirect's marketing and advertising success. Through these media, the three eras of the company's marketing, advertising and packaging strategy is clearly visible:
Fair Trade Solidarity: Marketing Ethics 1993 -1999
Although the product quality has changed little over the years, the advertising, branding and packaging has gone through some significant changes. Early packaging tended towards simplicity but with large amounts of text telling customers about the product and the producers (see Table 1 ). This fits well with a solidarity view of the products by bringing the consumers and the producers closer together. It also supports the effort to market the ethics of the product by informing customers of how "ethical" the product is.
demonstrating pride (see Figure 2 ) and tended to contain a testimony and portray how buying Cafédirect assists these coffee farmers and their communities. This ties in closely with attempts to draw customers into feeling solidarity with producers and to begin the process of demonstrating how Cafédirect provides a more ethical and sustainable alternative choice in the coffee market.
Fair Trade Solidarity 1991-1999 Market Ethics

Mass-Market 2004-Present Market Uniqueness
Market Development 1999-2003 Market Quality
Table1: Packaging Developments in the Cafédirect Brand Portfolio
As brand recognition grew, Cafédirect became more controversial by suggesting that not only was their coffee ethical but, by their very nature, the mainstream competition was not (see the 'Whiff' advert in Figure 3 ). Similarly, they attacked the "fat-cat" mentality of large corporations as their 'Has Been' advert from the appropriately-titled 'edge' campaign shows (also in Figure 3 ). In a stroke of creativity, 'Has Been' was powerfully displayed on the Guardian's obituaries page on September 8 th , 1997 which was otherwise entirely dedicated to the main obituary for one of Africa's most corrupt dictators, Mobutu Sese Seke. Over the following two years, there was continued progress into new advertising methods and media with the first, highly evocative cinema advertisement for any fair trade company in which the peak of Machu Picchu (The face in the mountain in the poster below) rises up at the smell of the coffee. In another first, Cafédirect was granted advertising rights on the London Underground for its new brand 5065 during this period.
Figure 4: Market development evocative and quality image campaigns
from the grower (or the "core ethics" message previously used) to the experience of the consumer. Consequently, there was a major reduction in the amount of fair trade text on the packaging and advertising, with grower testimonies becoming 3-line sound bites rather than stories. There was even talk of dropping the Fairtrade© Mark altogether as Cafédirect had higher brand awareness than the Mark itself. Although this did not occur, the space given over to the Mark was distinctly reduced. The impact of this new, customer experience message was to spark a rapid growth in sales and much greater brand awareness and market share rising above the 3% barrier.
As each product was rebranded to reflect its new positioning, the company began to have a new problem. Although sales had been increasing for a number of years in each category and the brands were considered quality premium products, they each needed their own marketing and sales support which led to rapidly increasing costs in slowly growing markets.
Competitors also began to follow their lead by rebranding and adopting product quality messages. The market has also seen a vast increase in the number of fair trade brands on the supermarket shelf, including premium coffees from major roasters, budget own-label brands from supermarkets and fair trade lines from Nestlé (and similarly branded "sustainable" coffee from Kenco). Competitive advantage from the "core ethics" of the product was being eroded and with trusted brands bringing out quality products, the quality message was no longer as effective. The impact was Cafédirect's revenues and growth had begun to shrink.
Market research undertaken by Cafédirect suggested that consumers were not aware that its coffees, teas and cocoas came from the same organisation, meaning that Cafédirect could not leverage the success of its coffee to sell newer products (interview in 2007 with former CEO
at Cafédirect, 1998 Cafédirect, -2008 . The CEO also confirmed that now the quality of the brand was publicly recognised and with more competitors matching this quality, the main differentiator for the organisation needs to change:
"The key strength identified was our relationships with producers which demonstrated our values and integrity. The research showed that our stakeholders want us to shout about these relationships by symbolising through producer stories showing the impact of these fair trade relationships. This should be at the heart of our values resulting in a trusted brand, dividends and social/environmental benefits for producers."
With product quality now established, it became the organisational values and Cafédirect's corporate brand communications that would influence sales growth and help reduce marketing expenditure. Beginning in 2004, , Cafédirect undertook a corporate product and rebranding programme which culminated in 2007 with its brand portfolio being presented as a family of related products.
Mass-Markets: Marketing Uniqueness 2004-present
In making this move, the company departed from product brand marketing towards corporate brand marketing -or a "branded house" in the parlance-to communicate how uniqueness of Cafédirect across its range of brands.
The company can justifiably claim a range of innovations which makes it unique: the first fair trade company to advertise, the innovator of the first fair trade instant coffee and the first fair trade company to have an initial public offering (IPO). It can also identify a number of market initiatives such setting up as the Gold Standard where not only does the company pay the fair trade premium to growers, but it also pays an additional premium for grower development initiatives. Cafédirect has invested £1.9 million or 60% of operating profit into Producer Partner Programmes in the 3 years to 2007. Since its IPO in 2004, it have also handed over a portion of its share issue to the producer community -4.9 % of equity -in order to give producers a role in the governance of the organisation.
The company now attempts to leverage stories of sustainability and shared ownership in its marketing communications as reasons why people should preferentially buy "Brand Cafédirect" over other competing products. As a consequence, Cafédirect's physical products are no longer featured in today's advertising.
The transition to corporate marketing communications based on uniqueness has been a gradual process. In many ways, there has always been an undercurrent of this but over the last 5 years, the vast majority of Cafédirect's advertising has been based on "events" and big extravaganzas. Examples of this include the extent to which they have involved themselves with the Glastonbury Rock Festival and the Edinburgh Fringe. One major investment has been on "The Lift" (pictured in Figure 5a with the comedy group The Pineapple Boys) which is a miniature entertainment venue where small audiences (as many as will fit) are treated to live entertainment. It is quite literally a lift making the Cafédirect 'experience' somewhat avant-garde and a magnet for drawing press attention. Thus, Cafédirect's approach to distribution has been a vital element in shifting fair trade products into mainstream consumption. The company was able to convince trade buyers and consumers alike that it is not just a niche brand but a mass-market competitor with a unique selling proposition. How this message has been successfully communicated over time is of critical importance for Cafédirect. For a relatively new company with a workforce that has never risen above 35 people, this is a bold marketing and sales position to have adopted and has been achieved by giving the impression of size through its extensive use of networks.
Cafédirect's Networks through its Business Development Cycle
Cafédirect were founded as a joint venture between four organisations with different capabilities. With Twin Trading as their supply chain partner, they needed no buyers or supply chain managers (or plantations for that matter). In fact, Cafédirect was, and still is, a virtual organisation. Currently, Keith Spicer 7 manufacture, package and distribute their teas and Gala 8 roast, grind, package and distribute their coffees. This enables Cafédirect to remain small and entirely marketing and demand management focused. It has meant that the company can appear to the market as a much larger organisation than it is through the use of existing business networks and links to the market. This has given the company greater credibility and market impact despite only being a small, entrepreneurial business. Over its business development cycle, Cafédirect has gone through three distinct stages in its network usage which reflect its marketing developments previously discussed. Figure 6 ). This network is consistent with the marketing and branding of Cafédirect during the fair trade solidarity period.
The solidarity launch stage: Cafédirect's business network
Cafédirect's business network during its market development growth phase
During this growth stage, Cafédirect began to assume more responsibility for sales and marketing, taking away the initiative from its founding partners. The company also started to rely less on ATOs for retailing its products or advertising its brands as they move more towards traditional style advertising, such as posters and print adverts, and mass-market distributors. They also partnered with Coffee Fresh 9 for vending machine distribution and had an agreement with Costa Coffee to ensure distribution in the growing market for coffee shops.
In order to develop the market for both its own brands and the fair trade category in general, distribution was widened and Cafédirect's marketing and sales resources were increased by introducing more commercial partners into the network and reducing its commitments to the ATOs (see Figure 7 ). Development (DfID) on health and poverty issues in Africa (see Figure 8 for Cafédirect's current business networks). Arguably, this strategy once again starts to push the company back towards the charity-style public image they once tried so hard to cast off. However, one of the differences now is that the people involved in the company are no longer ATO workers with experience working in Africa (as they were in the beginning), but former sales and marketing managers from GlaxoSmithKline, Mars and Nestlé and other multinationals.
Over time, Cafédirect has effected very significant changes in the type of companies it networks with and the ways in which these networks are leveraged. Originally, a high sales forces were also key to the network in the early stages. To a certain extent, this original marketing strategy was driven by cost because, as a small business, Cafédirect could not afford expensive sales and marketing. Also, weight was added to Cafédirect's sustainability claims by using church groups and other charities to advertise their products. Now, the influence of the founding partners of the company has been significantly reduced.
For instance, Equal Exchange the original sales and marketing team for Cafédirect, is no longer involved in running the company. Shortly after moving to London, Cafédirect effectively curtailed its relationship by only allowing them to act as the distributor for Cafédirect brands into the catering, health and wholefood markets. Within a couple of years, the company had effectively by-passed even this arrangement with Equal Exchange by agreeing to supply direct to their biggest customer (Suma). Cafédirect has not only reduced its use of the founders' sales and marketing teams, it has also begun to formalise their relationships with them by using service level agreements in place of the trust-based agreements. At precisely the same time as these events, Cafédirect converted from private to public ownership, reducing each of the founding partners from 25% share to 10% share in the company and reducing their position on the Board to one representative.
Cafédirect has moved away from the ATOs to more traditional business partners such as BridgeThorne (outsourced retails sales and distribution), Coffee fresh (vending machines) and selling directly to Suma (major warehouse and distribution centres for independent retailers.
As the range of partners that Cafédirect works with increases dramatically, they are beginning to look more like any other small coffee business as they make connections to advance the commercial aspects of the firm whilst concentrating less on the ethical image they had portrayed in the past.
Cafédirect: Where to next?
Cafédirect has been a huge marketing success story. They have consistently grown far faster than the total market although not necessarily as fast as some competitors (see Table 2 ). In In 2006, the company made its first after-tax loss since 1995(see financial results in Figure 9 ). During 2007, retail sales actually fell 4% for the first time in the company's history to £17.0 million which must be viewed with some concern as 70% of total company turnover is via the retail channel. Fairtrade© coffee at retail level overall is still growing at 33% volume and 24% retail (Fairtrade Foundation, 2008) ; Cafédirect does not seem to be capitalising on this and is also feeling the effects of increasing competition from both like-for-like fair trade goods, including supermarket own-label fair trade products, and new, sustainable coffees. relatively conservatively compared to the rest of the coffee market (Figure 10 ), Similarly, although the predicted growth in coffee shops is still strong (bold line), this growth is definitely slowing too, indicating near-saturated markets in both retail and out-of-home coffee consumption. This could be an issue for Cafédirect as they have recently started investing in their own high street coffee shops to take advantage of this growing market. There is also a problem in the target age group for coffee consumption amongst the demographic group called the Thirdage (hashed line of Figure 10 ) as there is actually a predicted fall in this age bracket of people 45 years and older. This may have a double impact on Cafédirect as fair trade itself is more attractive to Thirdage consumers than other demographic groups (Nichols and Opal, 2005; Strong, 1996; 1997) . Taken together, these market predictions adversely impact on the overall market forecast for coffee sales (shortdash line), making coffee a far less attractive market than it was a few years ago.
Through its current and past networks, Cafédirect has been able to convince their stakeholders that it is a much larger business than it really is. It has been able to cast off its charity image for a professionalism not seen previously in fair trade companies, and has exploited just about every opportunity to expand its public profile whilst growing its contacts at governmental, industrial and consumer levels. Cafédirect now buys from 39 producer organisations representing over 250,000 growers from 13 different countries (Cafédirect, 2007) , and the fair trade movement is now generally recognised as an alternative approach to traditional trading models Nicholls and Opal, 2005; Raynolds et al, 2007 In the face of this increasing market threats, we are seeing the current Cafédirect management team expanding its ethical message by engaging in broader issues such as ethical consumption, overseas development aid and human rights issues….. as well as climate change through its involvement with DfID and GTZ.
The company has also to deal with the negative publicity about fair trade that appears in the press from time to time, such as the accusation that fair trade is not living up to its promises to growers or that it is been subverted by multinational organisations (Nestlé "Partners' Blend" being awarded the Fairtrade© Mark). Fair trade organisations are sometimes criticised for 'colluding' with the supermarkets by 'agreeing to' the profit levels supermarkets achieve on fair trade products (BBC, 2006) . Cafédirect has even been accused of destabilising the market by swimming counter to market economics, representing nothing more than protectionism and, as such, damaging free trade across the whole coffee market (Kappler, 2001, CBI and British Soluble Coffee Manufacturers' Association in The Guardian, 1998, p.22) . However this argument assumes that free trade was working in the first place. For small-scale coffee farmers receiving less for their product than it has cost them to produce sustainably, it's hard to see how this can work for such communities (Brown, 1993) .
Conclusions
As a case study, this paper attempts to explain Cafédirect's rise from obscurity to become the champion brand of the fair trade movement in the UK. Through the use of networks and the ways in which the company leverages its Fairtrade© status demonstrates great creativity and ingenuity which can be generally characterised as an aggressive, market-orientated approach.
However, the case also presents a microcosm of the issues surrounding ethical brand management. Cafédirect could only rely on core product ethics (being fair trade) and ethical messages to deliver a very limited market share. Product quality and corporate identity, combined with strong distribution and consumer awareness, have proved more important in achieving a greater market share and sales growth; Cafédirect has had to adapt its business model and core messaging to reflect this. The people within the organisation have also had to adapt to these changing market conditions.
Despite the flexibility of the Cafédirect management and the companies strong brand credentials, it is facing a number of challenges as a result of mainstreaming. Its first challenge is to maintain its unique ethical edge. Although Cafédirect today is more heavily sales driven than the charities and ATOs that founded the organisation were, is it fair to argue that its engagement with mainstream business has led to a dilution of the fair trade movement (Lowe and Davenport 2005a , 2005b , Murray et al 2006 , Taylor et al 2005 ?
Certainly, Cafédirect's structures and processes for selling its products are not particularly different to any other mainstream consumer business. Nevertheless, its ownership and engagement with supply chain development issues through PPP and Gold Standard suggest that its claim to be the authentic voice for subsistence growers is certainly as strong today as it always has been. However, the company is now competing against other organisations within the fair trade movement, unlike in earlier times where all fair trade companies presented a united front (Davies, 2007) . Especially if the coffee market goes the way of the chocolate market where big brand leaders ( in this case Cadbury's) convert their mainstream brands to fair trade. To a certain extent, this forces the company to adopt a defensive strategy to help protect its brand and it's now not insubstantial revenues. It is telling that the new CEO (formerly from Ribena) is an experienced consumer goods marketer, skilled in protecting market share rather than an entrepreneur experienced at growing an ethical business.
The second challenge faced by Cafédirect in mainstreaming is whether or not it is cleanwashing its partner organisations (Murray and Raynolds, 2000; Golding and Peattie, 2005; Valor, 2006) . Unlike its sister company Divine Chocolate, Cafédirect does not directly license its products to other organisations for own-label production. It does, however, provide the opportunity for organisations in its network partnership to gain reputational benefits whilst contributing very little to the movement. An extreme example of this is an airline demonstrating commitment to sustainability by having fair trade coffee on-board, perhaps in an attempt to deflect attention from other environmental issues.
The third challenge may be about survival of the company rather than promoting development of the fair trade movement. has been a movement towards corporate ethics as its unique differentiator leading to an involvement in numerous ethical activities and promoting this engagement over a broader series of sustainability issues. Davies and Crane (2003) discussed the idea of ring-fencing the fair trade ideology behind a "moral curtain" and really promoting that message over all other activities. In writing this case, we cannot readily identify whether Cafédirect's corporate marketing activities about its various positions on global ethical issues is having an impact on the slowing of sales growth since there are too many other factors at play in the market.
However, evidence from Mintel (2008) would suggest the majority of customers are not sufficiently savvy to comprehend multiple messages on ethical or sustainability issues (e.g.
confusing organics and fair trade).
Appendix 1: Methodology
The data used in this case study come from two longitudinal, exploratory studies into the management and implementation of strategy in Cafédirect over the periods of 1999-2004 and 1999-2008 respectively.
The methodology used in both studies involved the researchers gaining privileged access to the company to develop a deep understanding of the organisational phenomena (Glaser, 1992) . A case study approach was, therefore, selected as the principal method of gaining indepth information (Yin, 1994) . Data sources were wide ranging, including not only primary qualitative data (observation, interviews and attendance at corporate events) but also annual reports, company reports, secondary data, and statistics and surveys providing information of relevance to the study (Goulding, 2001) . These supplementary data sources provide some of the background as well as further verification of our findings from the qualitative works.
Nevertheless, the methods of enquiry are predominantly qualitative in order to gain this rich contextual understanding to promote revelatory case insight (Mintzberg, 1979, and Van Maanan, 1979) .
The predominant qualitative methods used in each study were: To ensure internal validity and reliability, a constant comparative method borrowed from grounded theory was utilised for both studies collectively (Barnes, 1996) multiple responses from different people within the same organisation were compared against each other, field notes and secondary sources. We subsequently interpreted these data outputs and provided underlying rationales for the companies actions from the data (Rubin and Rubin, 1995, Eisenhardt, 1989) . External validity and reliability was increased through triangulation with both secondary sources and formal interviews with appropriate third parties (such as network partners) to ensure greater rigour in the findings and conclusions (Askey and Knight 1999) .
Interviews were transcribed and run through a series of categorisation, abstraction, and comparison processes to identify themes which contribute to theory development (Spiggle, 1994 ). Aspects of theory were then reviewed iteratively to decide on the direction of future data collection and emergent themes were then put to participants for review and refinement prior to writing this final version of the case study. 
Appendix 2: Teaching Appendix
